Introduction
Cooperatives have long played an important role in improving living conditions for their members, particularly low-income earners (Wanyama, Develtere, and Pollet 2009; Hartley 2011; ICA 2014) . Not surprisingly, they are often held up as pathways for the creation of new businesses and income generation capacities among poor communities (Wanyama, Develtere, and Pollet 2009; Hartley 2011) . A recent definition describes them as -autonomous, self-help organisations controlled by their members‖ that act in terms of -democratic control by their members‖ and the maintenance of -their co-operative autonomy‖ (International Co-operative Alliance, cited in Hartley 2011, 69) . As elsewhere in Africa, it was the British colonial government that introduced cooperatives in Lesotho.
Some of the modern views on the developmental potential of cooperatives in Africa have roots in colonial-era initiatives. In the 1940s, the British colonial government introduced various mohair-and wool-product cooperatives in Lesotho to market skins and hides and to assist with production processes. By 1948, the colonial government introduced its first legislation on cooperatives, called -The Cooperative Societies Rules" (Muccobs and Jita 2009; Hartley 2011) , which dealt largely with agricultural activities. It was followed up by the Cooperative Societies -only known to locals -for many years. The practice was first brought to public attention in 1954 following the death of a woman in Kao who suffered fatal injuries following excavations in an unstable diamond pit (Thabane 2000 (Thabane , 2003 Maleleka 2007 ). The scant attention that scholars and policy makers have paid these mining activities is due not only to their small scale, but also due to the focus on labour, labour migration and remittances in a Cold War context (Gordon and Spiegel 1993) .
In this frame, Lesotho became known primarily as a labour reserve for South Africa and its smaller industries were overlooked in favour of larger structural concerns.
This neglect has allowed political elites and international capital to get away with organising mining in their interests and to the detriment of artisanal miners.
In order to correct some of these oversights, the core of this paper examines on the formation and transformation of Liqhobong Diamond Mine Cooperative in the Butha-Buthe district in the north-eastern part of Lesotho. It details the impact that the arrival of a multinational company had on members of the cooperative and describes the resulting competition and conflict between commercial and artisanal mining, specifically over land-use and access to diamonds. The paper captures the narratives of artisanal miners on their experiences as diggers and as members of the cooperative, and compares households of cooperative members with those of nonmembers. The ethnographic research on which the paper is based was undertaken The first section of this paper deals with the theory on economic activities in Lesotho. The second section discusses the historical background of diamond mining in Kao and Letšeng villages during the late colonial (1948) (1949) (1950) (1951) (1952) (1953) (1954) (1955) (1956) (1957) (1958) (1959) (1960) (1961) (1962) (1963) (1964) (1965) (1966) and early postindependence (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) periods. This is followed by an examination of the Liqhobong Diamond Mine Cooperative (1978 Cooperative ( -2014 . The paper closes with an analysis of the implications of artisanal diamond mining for a -human economy‖ (Hart and Sharp 2015) .
A human economy
Historically, the livelihoods of Basotho in Lesotho's rural areas have largely depended on agricultural production and remittances from South Africa (Turner 2001; Molefe 2009; Nseera 2014; Murray 1981; Turner 2005) . The so-called -mineral revolution‖ in the region was sparked by the discovery of diamonds and gold in South Africa in the late nineteenth century. This revolution led, amongst other things, to an increased demand for food and labour on the mines and in the secondary industries that developed alongside them. This demand had a regional dimension.
On the one hand, Lesotho became a major supplier of grain to South African mining towns, what Colin Murray (1981, xi) called the -granary‖ of South Africa. On the other, Basotho men began to engage in wage labour on the mines and families became increasingly dependent on wages from South African mines.
The regional mining system thus created an economic system in which the regional market for labour was a striking feature. The freeing-up of labour for this market transformed social relations all over the region. It also created new forms of dependency within households, and between households and the wider money economy. Lesotho's rural economy was significantly impacted upon by the migrant labour system (Murray 1981 Spiegel 1980 Ferguson 1991) . As Lesotho became more interlinked with the regional economy, it not only lost aspects of its economic autonomy, but it also became more and more difficult to conceive of a national economy.
Over the last 20 years or so, labour on South Africa mines has shifted from being the backbone of Basotho livelihoods to being an occupation for a fortunate few. Due to widespread retrenchments on the mines, young Basotho men are no longer able to follow previous generations of men to seek employment on South African mines (Turner 2005) . As a result, young men find it ever more difficult to amass the resources needed to start an independent household. With no new employment opportunities in South Africa, it is becoming clear that households must build livelihood in Lesotho itself. Yet here young people compete for a handful of work opportunities at Maseru factories with long hours and minimal wages (Turner 2005) .
Retrenched miners typically embark on agricultural production upon their return to Lesotho, or take up activities in the informal economy such as artisanal diamond mining (see, for example, Makhetha 2017; Maliehe 2015) . Unsurprisingly, the significance of the informal economy has increased in response to the decline of migrant labour. The concept of the informal economy was coined to describe unregistered small-scale economic activities (Hart 1973, 61-89 ; see also Hart and Sharp 2015, 8; Chen 2012, 2; Motšoene 2013, 55) . Being unregistered, these economic activities are largely invisible to the bureaucracy. Hence, those involved in these activities do so on their own accord through economic democracy.
In contrast to the earlier macro-economic approach, Hart, Laville and Cattani (2010) started advocate for a -human economy‖ approach. According to them, -dominant economic institutions and ideologies often obscured, marginalised or repressed‖ the ways in which regular people -insert themselves practically into economic life‖ (5). Instead, -people make and remake their economic lives‖ and scholars should trust -the people to identify and explain their own interests‖ (Hart and Sharp 2015, viii) . This new focus on a -human economy‖ is both a theoretical and a political project. Politically, it aims -to promote economic democracy by helping people organise and improve their own lives‖ by presenting them with easily understandable findings for their own practical use (Hart 2015, 4) . Theoretically, the human economy approach calls for renewed attention to everyday economic practices, documented through the ethnographic method, that should be set against, and in relation to, a global economic system and emergent world society historically understood (Hart and Sharp 2015; Hart 2015) . It is an approach that informed the writing of this paper, which is why we now turn to the historical context from which the Liqhobong Diamond Mine Cooperative emerged.
History of Lesotho's diamond mining sector
In the 1830s, land became a central source of conflict between Basotho communities and European settlers (Mothibe and Ntabeni, cited in Motšoene 2013, 69; Maliehe 2015, 48; Thabane 1995) . In the 1860s, when Lesotho became a British colony, European land speculators were eagerly scouring the land for mining opportunities, after a series of discoveries of mineral deposits in different parts of South Africa from the mid-1860s. Speculators were convinced that these deposits originated in, or extended to, other territories of the region and thus sought to acquire land rights in territories adjacent to South Africa, including Lesotho. Yet, due to Lesotho being a British colony, the tactic of acquiring land either by conquest or by agreement with local chiefs could not be applied. Rather, speculators had to apply for mining rights that were considered both by the chiefs in direct charge of the land and by colonial officials. Lesotho chiefs, however, routinely turned down these applications: they feared losing more land to Europeans against a background of land scarcity due to an increasing population and growing livestock numbers; and they feared losing sovereignty over land leased to Europeans. For many years, the colonial government supported them in this policy (Thabane 1995; .
The early days (colonial era 1948-1966) Artisanal diamond mining began in the Lesotho highland towns of Kao, Letšeng, Liqhobong, Kolo, Nqechane and Hololo as far back as the 1930s. The death of a female minder in 1954 -marked the end of individual diamond digging in Kao‖ (Thabane 1995 52) . Soon thereafter, Kao became a site of contestation between international commercial mining companies and individual diggers, with the colonial government often siding with the commercial miners. This three-pronged conflict over diamond digging in Kao became a microcosm of the forces and dynamics that shaped economic life in Lesotho (Thabane 1995, 52 ).
In the 1950s, the colonial government pressurised regent 'Mantšebo 1 to allow the General and Mining Finance Corporation (GENCOR), a South African company then under the leadership of Colonel Jack Scott, to prospect the whole country. The permission granted by 'Mantšebo was strongly opposed by local people who considered it contrary to the traditional land tenure system and processes of decision-making as the regent had not discussed the matter with the chiefs (Thabane 2000) . This decision started a conflict over land and mining rights between the villagers, the state and commercial mining companies, a conflict that has continued to the present.
Among the kimberlite pipes that GENCOR identified during its prospecting were those at Letšeng and Kao. Those at Letšeng were considered uneconomic (Thabane 2000, 106) , so that GENCOR decided to focus on Kao. In 1959, the Basutoland Diamonds Corporation (BDC), a subsidiary of De Beers and GENCOR, started mining the Kao deposit (Thabane 2000, 106 ).
GENCOR's exclusive prospecting and mining rights meant that individual artisanal Basotho miners had to cease their operations in Kao (Thabane 2000, 106) .
Faced with the possibility of other digging opportunities also being closed for them, Kao diggers and other interested parties decided to take action: they took control of the Kao deposit when the BDC employees had gone to the lowlands to escape the highland winter. In response, the BDC stationed security staff to guard the mine at all times when no employees were present. However, resentful of being dispossessed of their livelihoods, the artisanal miners reoccupied the diggings by force, removing all staff that was left behind (Ambrose 2004, 3) . The colonial government responded to this occupation by persuading Paramount Chief Bereng Seeiso to declare the Letšeng's deposits, which GENCOR's prospecting had found -uneconomic,‖ open to artisanal diamond miners. The Kao artisanal miners duly moved to the re-opened Letšeng site while the BDC was able to return to Kao (Thabane 2000, 106) .
From August 1961 onwards, artisanal diamond mining in Letšeng was subjected to strict government control: individual diggers had to obtain government licences and declare their finds to a Diggers' Committee (Thabane 2000) . Diggers who could not meet the requirements for a licence were forced to remain in Kao.
These diggers refused to accept these restrictions: at night, they -poached‖ the diamondiferous Kao ores to which BDC had the concession in order to process it secretly during the day. These poaching miners became known as Liphokojoe tsa Kao [the foxes of Kao]. They slept in hills and caves close to the mineral deposits.
Their political militancy was driven by two factors: firstly, they considered the makhooa [white people, by implication foreigners] who were mining Kao as having no legitimate claim to Lesotho's mineral wealth; secondly, unlike Letšeng, the Kao site was not guarded by policemen (Thabane 2000, 107) . Theirs was a literal and radical interpretation of the idea that mineral wealth is invested in the Basotho nation and was not to be owned by outsiders. Liphokojoe miners and those Basotho employees of the BDC who did not escape the highland winter destroyed the mine's machines and dismantled the BDC's cabins for its foreign employees in order to build shacks for themselves (Thabane 1995, 133) . The artisanal miners did not avoid violence in their actions: one European supervisor escaped an attack they had planned against him (Thabane 1995, 133) . -independence (1966-1978) Shortly after Independence, in 1967, militant Liphokojoe miners managed to drive out the BDC from Kao; they re-opened the deposit for artisanal diamond mining The miners displaced from Kao, and others from Liqhobong, were given the option of moving to new deposits at Lemphane (then known to many as PhokojoeKhoaba) with a modest resettlement grant, access to water, rotary pans and Canadian-funded houses (Ambrose 2004, 4; Maleleka 2007, 7; Thabane 1995; Hall 2004, 14) . The government used the aid monies from the Canadian International Development Agency to set up a revolving loan through which artisanal miners could acquire mining equipment (Maleleka 2007, 7; Hall 2004, 14) and housing in
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Lemphane. In return, the state expected the diggers to work as a cooperative and to repay some of the state-supplied equipment. In 1976, about 6 000 artisanal miners 
Liqhobong Diamond Mine Cooperative, 1978-2014

Founding of the cooperative
When artisanal miners were incited to move to Lemphane, not all of them followed the government's call. Those that remained at Liqhobong continued to be a headache for the authorities. In an attempt to prevent further rebellion and occupations, the BNP-led government grouped all licensed diamond diggers together in late 1978 and sponsored the formation of a cooperative. Named the Liqhobong Diamond Mine Cooperative (LDMC), it consisted of roughly 900 men and women at its inception. The state exercised tight control over the cooperative by placing government officials in the LDMC leadership structures (Hall 2004; Thabane 1995) .
The formation of the LDMC did not stop unlicensed artisanal miners from continuing mining activities. Miners who preferred to work independently deserted the main deposit at Liqhobong and moved to dig on the river banks in the area. Yet even here they were pursued and pushed out by the police and by LDMC members.
In turn, the formation of the LDMC attracted miners from Liqhobong and districts further afield to mine at Liqhobong's main deposit.
According to former LDMC members, the formation of the cooperative caused diamond mining is often only one among many sources of income for households (Mwaipopo et al. 2004) . My fieldwork suggests that the same was true for Liqhobong villagers and artisanal miners -although LDMC membership did allow families to depend more on a mining income than was the case for non-members. LDMC members indicated that households with cooperative members had a more stable income and a higher sense of security. Non-LDMC households, in contrast, were more precarious. Mr Tlou (67 years), a former artisanal miner from Liqhobong, remembered:
I was not a member of the project. So, whenever we were digging for diamonds, people working for the project and police would chase us away.
When we worked, we used to be afraid of the police as well as project Some former LDMC miners indicated that MineGem gave them an initial payment of ZAR 10 000 and later one for ZAR 6 500. Others reported, however, that they received a single cash payment only. All insisted that these cash payments
were not MineGem's promised pension, but that they were the refund of their membership fees. Mr Thabathe (57 years) of Liqhobong stated:
The money that they [MineGem] gave us is our contributory fee; it is not a compensation for buying our cooperative mine. We [former LDMC miners] are still waiting for the compensation, because what they gave us is what we contributed by ourselves. We used to contribute R100 per person while working in a cooperative. Hence, the money given to us is from there.
Most of the LDMC miners were dissatisfied with MineGem's takeover, yet many seemed to have lost hope that they would ever receive their promised compensation.
They explained that this money was supposed to have been deposited into their bank accounts. While some LDMC miners waited for their money, others went back to their villages without money. The human economy approach permits a view into concealed livelihoods, aspects that are ignored by macro-economic planners and development specialists.
It allows an understanding of what people -do on the ground, not what economics textbooks claim they are supposed to do‖ (Laterza 2013, 135) . It is thus possible to read the Liqhobong miners' resistance to commercial mining and their understanding of access to land in terms of new forms of economic democracy, whereby artisanal miners -express their own interests‖ (Hart and Sharp 2015, viii) by laying claim to deposits currently outside of commercial interests. From the late 1990s onwards,
former LDMC miners have joined the unlicensed miners who had fought and resisted the formation of the LDMC, thus breaking with their previous conviction that only they had lawfully access to the deposit through the power of the state. The paper thus argues that former LDMC members lost belief in the validity of contractual agreements with the state when the Lesotho government sold their stake in Liqhobong mine to makhooa and caused all artisanal miners to loose their jobs.
Notes
1. I was able to conduct one preliminary interview with one official from Liqhobong Diamond Mine Company but this official subsequently refused to be interviewed again. Therefore, it might seem that the paper is one sided and has unfairly focused on the state and commercial mining companies. This is not the intention, since it is based on the findings from the above-mentioned categories of informants. If officials from these companies are more transparent, I would gladly interview them in future research.
2. I was unable to find further evidence regarding these negotiations. I only got access of the report from the registry of the Department of Cooperatives through an official from the department. I was not allowed to photocopy or take the report out of the office. I was told to just write some important points from the report.
